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What are we saying when we talk about corporate governance? 
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the discourses of corporate board members with regard to their world-
views of governance and the influence that their collective mind-sets might have on the wider 
practice of governance.  The metaphors employed by board members to describe corporate 
governance are examined and compared with the literature to establish the extent to which 
they reflect normative theory and prescription.  Our analysis confirms an overwhelming pre-
occupation among board members with compliance and control, which may have unintended 
consequences, as well as implications for organisational innovation and enterprising.  The 
paper also contributes to the literature in examining the value of metaphor based, interpretive 
discourse analysis as a methodological approach outside the usual frameworks of corporate 
governance research that may contribute a new perspective on mental-models-in-existence 
among practitioners and enhance theory development. 
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Introduction 
With regard to definitions and scope of governance, attention has focused, both in 
scholarship and practice, on accountability, the regulatory environment within governance, 
the assurance of compliance with regulations and control over the organisation’s 
management, as well as the search for universal principles of conduct (Short, Keasey, Wright 
and Hull, 1999).  But Healy (2003) warns of a risk that, with such an emphasis, directors' 




Against this pre-occupation with the structural “conformance” dimension of 
governance, board members' day-to-day experience has tended to be ignored.  After reviewing 
127 empirical articles on board behaviour and governance, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004: 24) 
concluded that most of these studies considered boards to be an isolated “black box”, 
“assuming that the behavior and conduct of directors can be inferred from the board’s 
demographic characteristics… [These researchers thus] neglect board processes, such as 
interactions among groups of actors, board leadership, the development of rules and norms, 
and the board decision-making culture”.  Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) noted that behavioural 
perspectives on boards are still largely unexplored, but insights into their processes would add 
significantly to our knowledge of effective boards and governance.  Daily, Dalton, and 
Cannella (2003) stated that governance researchers too seldom embrace findings that go 
against their narrow conceptualizations of the entirety of corporate governance and argued 
that there is a need to dismantle fortresses in research about boards and governance. 
Where studies have sought to open the "black box", attempts by researchers to quantify 
board members’ attitudes (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 2009; Robins, 2006) may fail to articulate the 
authentic voices of those involved.  As far as we can ascertain, studies that have directly 
sought directors' views of governance are scant.  To the best of our knowledge no studies 
have examined board members' world-views and experience of governance in relation to how 
their collective mind-sets might influence, endogenously, the wider practice of governance.  
Attention has instead focused mainly on impacting governance practice, exogenously, through 
imposing tougher rules and tighter regulations based on a narrow reading of governance and 
corporate intent.  Pye (2002), for instance, reported on how concentration of power in UK 
companies has led to a decisive shift in the rhetoric of directors, investors, and financial 




When directors are asked to outline their experience of governance, what do they say?  
What images of governance might directors most commonly convey in their discourses?  
How far do they echo theory, and how do they represent the governance contribution to the 
management task?  Is governance seen as a strategic activity, a stewardship activity, or a 
control activity?  Which of these board tasks is most strongly represented in directors’ views?  
And do directors respond to apparent conflicts and paradoxes between them?  With the 
criticisms of governance research highlighted above and these questions in mind, we chose to 
sample the discourses of board members across a range of large corporations, exploring their 
conversational language and imagery while they talked about governance in informal 
interviews.  By applying discourse analysis to such accounts, we were able to note dominant 
and non-dominant images of, orientations to, and paradoxes in, corporate governance, and to 
compare these conceptualizations with scholarly theory and recommended practice. 
The objectives of this paper are threefold: first, to examine the metaphors employed by 
board members to describe corporate governance in the hope of generating meaningful 
insights into perceptions of the purpose and role of governance.  Second, the metaphors 
emerging from the data in our study are compared with the literature on corporate governance 
to establish the extent to which they reflect normative theory and prescription.  Third, and 
most significantly, the paper examines the value of a metaphor-based approach as a tool for 
analysing models of corporate governance.  This analysis may contribute a new perspective 
on mental-models-in-existence among practitioners and enhance theory development by 
adopting a research approach outside the usual frameworks applied to corporate governance 
research.  For this reason we discuss the method in some detail.  The paper seeks to show how 
this interpretive method of discourse analysis could be used as a practical tool for better 
understanding and diagnosing governance problems and for the management and design of 
governance structures more generally. 
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Metaphor in Theory 
Derived from the Greek metapherein, meaning transference, metaphor can be 
understood as a figure of speech used to imply resemblance between an action or object, event 
or experience on the one hand and a widely understood word or phrase on the other.  Its 
function is to communicate “the unknown by transposing it in terms of the known” (Gowler 
and Legge, 1989: 439).  At a simple level, “metaphors involve the transfer of information 
from a relatively familiar domain (source or base domain) to a new and relatively unknown 
domain (target domain)” (Tsoukas, 1991: 568).  Meaning occurs through “the familiarity of 
the links between two domains – a source and a target” (Oswick, Putnam and Keenoy, 2004: 
109). 
The use of metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but also in 
thought and action (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).  In terms of how we both think and act, our 
ordinary conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.  As Morgan (1983: 601) 
asserted, metaphors are “a basic structural form of experience through which human beings 
engage, organise and understand their world”.  Metaphor is described by Morgan (1996: 228) 
as “a primal, generative process that is fundamental to the creation of human understanding 
and meaning in all aspects of life”.  Because metaphors are ubiquitous in everyday discourse, 
however, we are often oblivious to their occurrence and their underlying meanings (Lakoff, 
2004).  
While metaphor can be regarded simply as a device for elaborating discourse, it has 
greater significance in implying a way of thinking and seeing which pervades our 
appreciation of the world in general.  Research in a wide variety of fields has demonstrated 
that metaphor wields a formative influence on language, thought patterns and everyday self-
expression (Stokes, 1998).  Metaphors are not neutral, merely representing an external reality: 
they also constitute that reality in the minds of an audience, often advocating or stipulating 
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how that reality should be perceived and considered (Cornelissen, 2004; Harré, 1984).  
Metaphors-in-use also may create their own self-fulfilling reality (Ghoshal, 2005; Lakoff and 
Johnston, 1980).  As expressed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 112), “Since much of our social 
reality is understood in metaphorical terms... metaphor plays a very significant role in 
determining what is real for us”. 
In the context of organisations, formal analysis, interpretation and diagnosis relies on 
the application of some kind of theory of the situation under consideration (Stokes, 1998).  
Theory is by nature both pervasive and an interpretation of reality.  Theories and explanations 
of organisational life are based on metaphors that lead to perceptions and conceptualisations 
of organisations that are distinctive yet partial, characteristically eliciting one-sided insights 
while tending to force other explanations into the background (Stokes, 1998).  Morgan 
(1980), for example, explored organisations characterised as (among other things) machines, 
and organisms, and brains: each metaphor expresses a truth about organisations, yet none 
provides a complete explanation; hence his advocacy of “multiple metaphor”, in which 
disparate aspects may coexist in a complementary or even paradoxical manner. 
While they may not be recognised as such, many taken-for-granted ideas about 
organisations and how they function are metaphorical.  This means that we are essentially 
unaware that our views and beliefs are being framed by powerful organisational actors 
through the subtle and not so subtle use of metaphors, thereby shaping our perception of 
particular circumstances (Tourish and Hargie, 2012).  With regard to organisational leaders, 
metaphors they use are “not linguistic decoration or verbal artistry: instead, metaphors are 
indicative of leaders’ thinking and form a basis of their actions” (Oberlechner and Mayer-
Schoenberger, 2002: 5). 
The study of metaphors employed by those in leadership positions of major 
organisations is therefore of critical importance (Tourish and Hargie, 2012) if we are to 
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understand and address corporate issues that have implications beyond the organisations’ 
individual existence.  However, when used as a research method, good analysis depends not 
only on identifying which metaphor fits best, but also with using metaphor to unravel multiple 
patterns of significance and their interrelations (Morgan, 1986).  This paper seeks to illustrate 
how this might apply through exploring the implications of different metaphors for thinking 
about the nature and practice of governance in organisations. 
 
Metaphor as a research method 
In the last two decades metaphor has achieved prominence in social science within the 
disciplines of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and organisation theory (Boxenbaum 
and Rouleau, 2011; Cornelissen, 2006), with a growing interest in the adoption of metaphor 
and critical discourse analysis as research tools.  As a consequence of this interest the study of 
metaphors in the broad terrain of organisation studies has expanded enormously (El-Sawad, 
2005; Heracleous and Jacobs, 2008; Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001). 
In the organizational context, Fleming (2005: 48) noted that “The use of metaphor in 
scholarship is an important dimension of theory development and empirical analysis that 
enables researchers to visualize organizational processes from multiple perspectives.”  As a 
method of analysis metaphor offers the possibility of developing rich insights into the mind-
sets of organisational leaders, and the likely impact on their cognitive processes. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) believe that metaphors encourage researchers to look 
beyond existing concepts and models, thereby helping to unveil features currently obscured 
from view.  Individuals draw on metaphor to convey feelings and thoughts and to express 
experiences, ideas and emotions that might otherwise remain unarticulated.  The utility of 
metaphor as a method of analysis is in offering insights to hidden, barely conscious feelings 
and attitudes (Cazal and Inns, 1998: 179; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  This generative 
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capacity of metaphor (Alvesson, 1994; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Morgan, 1996; Tietze, 
Cohen and Musson, 2003) offers the possibility of accessing new conceptual insights. 
Metaphors are not always stated explicitly but are often embedded in the deep structure 
of a text (Tourish and Hargie, 2012).  For this reason analysts need to draw out metaphors’ 
implied and explicit inferences, their paradoxes and contradictions, as well as paying attention 
to their formal content and intent.  Unless they are so superficial as to offer no new meaning, 
metaphors can thus generate powerful, vivid and evocative imagery (Oswick and Grant, 
1996a, 1996b) through their “ability to create and privilege new understandings while 
obscuring others as they become the scaffolding around which thoughts cohere” (Fairhurst 
2011: 181).  Metaphors allow cues from one context to be applied to the understanding of 
another whereby, in a particular context, a given world-view may be imagined or 
reconstructed (Oswick et al., 2004), and are powerful precisely because of their capacity to 
frame perceptions (Fairhurst, 2011). 
 
Discourse Analysis and Metaphor 
While scholarly work on governance from a discourse perspective using metaphor is, as 
we have noted, scant, discourse theory and analysis methods have been used to highlight 
many aspects of organisational life, including leadership (Fairhurst, 2009), human resource 
management (Keenoy, 1990), change processes (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007), public sector 
management (Ford, 2006) and total quality management (Xu, 1999).  Discourse approaches 
use sophisticated conceptual and methodological thinking and practice (Grant, Hardy, Oswick 
and Putnam, 2004) to explore how the meanings of phenomena are socially constructed, 
performed, contested and negotiated (Grant, Iedema and Oswick, 2009).  Given that there is a 
plethora of discursive methodologies available, the intent of this section is to establish our 
understanding, approach and methods with respect to discourse and the use of metaphor. 
8 
 
While discourse analysis can be seen as a “constellation of perspectives” (Fairhurst 
2009: 1608) held among many discourse researchers, they nonetheless tend to share an 
understanding of discourse or language as constitutive, and not merely reflective, of reality.  
Discourse does so primarily through being “a powerful [sub/unconscious] ordering force” 
(Alvesson and Karreman 2000: 1127) through “providing sets of representations, statements, 
narratives, images and codes” (Kuhn, 2006: 1342) that shape both the interpretation and 
practice of processes (such as governance).  Allison and Karreman (2011: 20) suggest that we 
think of the nature of the “shaping” in terms of “attention-shaping, agenda-setting and 
sometimes action-implying”.  In so doing we can see that discourse, while unable to account 
for everything to do with governance, can give insight into particular perceptions, mindsets 
and intentions. 
Given that discourse-based research is exceedingly rare in the governance field it is 
pertinent to address its value and difference.  Firstly, discourse directs attention to the 
constructedness of concepts where ways of talking and acting can be legitimised and 
sanctioned or restricted and constrained (Grant, Iedma and Oswick 2010).  Accordingly, a 
domain such as governance can be a negotiated and contested territory where different beliefs 
and values can paradoxically both co-exist and be in conflict.  Discourse approaches are used 
to explore and determine the meaning(s) of this type of social process for those who are 
involved in it.  From this reasoning, discourse analysis has the capacity to reveal the 
“struggle” or tensions (Grant, Keenoy and Oswick, 1998) that traverse the terrain of any 
social process such as governance.  The assumption here is that the meanings of such 
processes are fluid, producing something akin to a layering or nexus of multiple ways of 
seeing and being in governance that are unstable, contradictory and precarious.  Discourse 
analysis can track “the continuous disassembly and reassembly of new forms and patterns” 
(Iedema 2007: 936) of such processes and bring some visibility to the paradoxes and conflicts 
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which such movement between meanings inevitably creates or heightens.  In doing so, we 
note Alvesson and Skoldberg’s (2009: 232) point that any textual or discourse analysis can 
never fully assert what beliefs or meanings people “really hold”.  Nevertheless “it is possible 
to focus on utterances which reflect attitudes”: how and in what contexts they are expressed 
and constructed, and the functions they fulfil. 
 
Metaphor in the Corporate Management Literature 
A search of the organisation and management literature relating to metaphor in 
scholarly research reveals predominance of its use as a method of analysis in the area of social 
sciences and in particular, organisational studies (e.g. Beattie, 2005; Cornelissen, 2006; El-
Sawad, 2005; Hussain and Cornelius, 2006; Inkson, 2006; Morgan, 1980, 1986, 1997; Oswick 
and Montgomery, 1999).  These authors have adopted metaphor as a basis for analysis in 
relation to evaluating, comparing or grounding perceptions and meaning within topics ranging 
across business ethics, organisational stakeholders, images of organisation and organisational 
identity, and personal career paths.  In a related area within organisational studies, metaphor 
analysis also appears in business leadership studies (e.g. Amernic, Craig and Tourish, 2007; 
Beattie, 2005; Tourish and Hargie, 2012). 
El-Sawad (2005) used metaphor analysis as a method of studying organisational and 
working life and the conceptions of career.  Tourish and Hargie (2012) conducted a similar 
study in relation to the banking crisis where they analysed the responses of four senior 
bankers from major banking corporations in the UK who were called to give evidence to the 
Banking Crisis Inquiry of the Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons.  Their 
paper explored the root metaphors that emerged in the bankers’ testimony which sought to 
explain the crisis, deal with their role within it, and respond to the torrent of criticism in 
which they were engulfed. 
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Reference to metaphor similarly features in the field of corporate law with regard to 
shareholders as stakeholders (Green, 1993), inconsistency regarding value choices in use of 
metaphors (Greenwood, 2004), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Kuschnik, 2008), corporate policing 
(Baer, 2008), impact and comparison of European boardrooms and American law proposals 
(Norburn, 1985), and banded contracts (Fort and Noone, 1999).  While the use of metaphor 
within the corporate law literature makes reference to aspects of corporate governance, such 
reference is made with regard to legal compliance and legislative issues. 
Within the wider corporate governance literature, however, specific reference to the use 
of metaphor is notably limited, either as a figure of speech or, more particularly, as a method 
of research analysis.  A search of business and scholarly databases currently yields only two 
references where metaphor features as a way of understanding certain aspects of corporate 
governance.  In these two papers, respectively, Dragomir (2008a) used metaphor to address 
issues of legitimacy and accountability affecting corporate governance codes, and Gardiner 
(2006) claimed to relate transactional, transformational and transcendent forms of leadership 
metaphorically to the evolution of theory and practice of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, the corporate governance literature makes use of metaphors in its 
language, as indeed we have done in titling and introducing this paper.  The most often used 
metaphor in the governance context is that of the Orwellian idea of “Big Brother” (e.g. 
Kuschnik, 2008) with reference to the compliance dimension of corporate governance and 
board oversight of management.  This idea of close scrutiny is most often linked with 
perceptions of draconian measures in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the concept of the 
board of directors as a corporate “watchdog” (e.g. Brown, 1994; Gillette, Noe and Rebello, 
2003, Johnson, 2005), or with a corporate regulator and the idea of “policing” (e.g. Baer, 
2008, Henry, 2004).  In this context notions of surveillance and intrusion convey a negative 
image of governance.  However, in a more positive light the role of a corporate board has also 
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been referred to as that of a “pilot” in relation to its directing function (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992, Johnson, 2005) and the performance dimension of governance. 
With regard to codified structural requirements for board composition, Drucker (1974) 
and others have termed boards as a governance mechanism that mainly ratifies or “rubber 
stamps” management’s decisions, and as a “legal fiction” (e.g. (Galbraith, 1967; Mace, 1971; 
Herman, 1981; Vance, 1983; Wolfson, 1984).  Thus metaphors are used to convey particular 
meaning for corporate governance as a system (e.g. accountability, checks and balances, 
power, control), an institution (e.g. legitimacy, authority), a framework (e.g. rules, codes, 
relationships, processes, practices), a function (e.g. agency, compliance), or as actors or 
players (e.g. agents, principals). 
Gardiner (2006) applied what he termed the metaphors of “transactional”, 
“transformational” and “transcendent” to the leadership role of corporate governance, 
although such terms are not those usually associated with the language of metaphor, but 
instead suggest concepts.  Applying the concept of transformational leadership to describe 
Jack Welch’s management style, Amernic et al (2007) identified from his letters to 
shareholders five root metaphors: “pedagogue”, “physician”, “architect”, “commander” and 
“saint”.  Their study was located not within the corporate governance literature, however, but 
as with Tourish and Hargie’s (2012) study of bankers, within that of organisational studies. 
 
Research Method 
In this study, interviews were conducted with 36 CEOs and 25 Chairs of participating 
organisations which ranged across public, private, state-owned, multi-national and not-for-
profit sectors in New Zealand.  While the intention was to obtain for the sample, equal 
numbers of CEOs and Chairs, the difference in the numbers of each reflects multiple 
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appointments of Chairs across the organisations, as well as internationally-based Chairs not 
available for interview. 
Interviews focused on the areas of leadership, governance, strategy and ethics.  As 
stimuli, these words were printed on cue-cards (one word per card) and used by interviewers 
who placed and moved them in front of participants to elicit stream-of-consciousness 
responses.  Participants were invited to position (and juxtapose) the cards as they discussed 
relationships between concepts; questions were then shaped which probed and elaborated 
their thinking.  Nine interviewers collected 84 hours of recorded material which was 
transcribed then analysed, paying attention to the participants’ syntax, imagery, word choice 
and text structure for indications of how governance is formed in directors’ mind-sets and 
consequently, has “structuring effects” (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000: 1138).  The intention 
in this analysis process was to move beyond analysing “pure talk” (Alvesson and Karreman, 
2000: 1138) to discern how such talk may shape governance thought and practice. 
The approach we used for our data analysis is consistent with approaches advocated by 
Jäger (2001) and Leitch and Palmer (2010) for critical discourse analysis, as well as 
Cornelissen’s (2006) and Amernic et al’s (2007) approach to metaphor.  From this material 
we read and re-read text in detail in a process of “close reading” (Amernic et al., 2010; 
Turnage, 2010; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009) and assembled “connected set[s] of 
statements, concepts, terms and expressions” (Watson, 1994: 113) that appeared to speak to 
constructions of governance in specific and distinctive ways.  The intention was to identify 
metaphors-in-use, since, as stated by Eubanks (1999:195), “metaphor is rhetorically 
constituted.  No metaphor is spoken or written except in the context of a socio-historically 
bound communicative situation”.  From this process root metaphors were mapped and 
detailed examples of each were compiled. 
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While the bulk of our analysis presents and discusses such clusters of talk or discourse, 
we were also conscious of discourse as a “structuring principle of society, social institutions, 
mode of thought and individual subjectivity” (Weedon, 1987: 41).  We therefore organized, 
from analysing across the clusters, four such structuring principles or root metaphors so as to 
better uncover the mindsets, perceptions and assumptions of governance.  Of particular 
interest was the way in which such a process “ruled in” certain ways of talking about 
governance that are deemed acceptable, legitimate and intelligible, while also “ruling out”, 
limiting and restricting certain aspects of how governance might become possible (Grant et 
al., 2009).  We believe that the visibility of such “rules” can enhance the understanding, 
discussion and practice of governance. 
 
The Metaphors 
 Of interest from our analysis was the set of four images that seemed archetypal, into 
which the vast majority of the material produced by our participants could be categorized.  
Here, we first note two images that were major, in that each of them accounted for a great 
proportion of our material. Furthermore, both represented major, but different, discourses of 
control, which we labeled respectively “governance as managerial control” and “governance 
as strategic control”.  The other two images were minor, in that although each of them was 
distinctive and was embodied in a moderately-sized amount of participants’ discourse, this 
portion was minor compared with the other two images.  These images were of “governance 
as power balancing”, and “governance as wise mentorship”. We concede that the 
classification is our own: others might make different interpretations.  Each of the images is 
elaborated in the following sections by verbatim examples from participants’ discourse, along 
with discussion of the metaphors and the suggested framing effects that arise from them.  In 




1. Governance as Management Control 
This set of metaphors, which constituted more than half of our total material, was about 
control over management’s actions and decisions.  For example: 
The word governance typically is associated pretty much with conservative rules, 
policies, checking and rigour. (CEO) 
Classic descriptions of managerial control (e.g. Kerklaan, 2011 and OODA Loop) 
specify a series of logical steps, such as: 
1. Specify standards to be reached, or outcomes to be achieved or avoided; 
2. Monitor the situation to observe or measure actual performance or actions; 
3. Compare the observations or measures with the original objectives; 
4. Take action to rectify any discrepancy. 
Nearly all participants’ control metaphors clearly followed the parameters described in 
management frameworks for the exercise of close control over managerial operations.  Of 
interest, however, is the specific language used. 
1.1. Standard Setting: Framework- and Boundary-maker 
The metaphors used for the first stage of the control process were about creating 
structures – a mechanistic image which clearly existed as a basis for control: 
So, it’s providing the total enterprise with some framework within which it can operate 
and act as a control mechanism. (Chair) 
I’d say it’s a bit like the foundation. If you’re building a house it’s the foundation. 
(CEO) 
To me it is the fabric and the skeleton that we overlay over an organization to control 
and direct its operation. (Chair) 
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Some directors used the notion of construction as a contrast with leadership, which must 
operate within the structures created by governance: 
It’s like governance is the framework or the house, but the leadership is like the flavor 
of what you do inside it. (CEO) 
Governance provides the framework in which the leadership takes place but at the same 
time I think the governance expects the leadership to use those rules as guidelines, not 
to exceed them. (CEO) 
But my view is that it’s fundamentally about creating the guidelines and the policy in a 
directional type approach. (CEO) 
The notion of constraint was also implicit in participants’ frequent usage of the 
metaphor of boundary.  Thus: 
The governance piece is saying ‘okay, here’s the boundary – you can’t cross. (CEO) 
It’s control and it’s boundaries. It’s what you can and can’t do. (CEO) 
Actually being there when needed, setting boundaries. (Chair) 
Part of creating the garden is creating the boundary. And making sure that the 
boundary is firm, because that actually keeps everybody within the garden – now I’m 
back to my safety net. That’s a safety net that I think you have to have. (CEO) 
Overall, the standards determined by governance appear to have a constraining, “avoid 
the negative” rather than “reach the positive” connotation – the delinquent behavior to be 
eschewed, rather than the quality prize to be gained.  One participant noted the paradox 
implicit in such a view: 
This is one of those paradoxes where I think leadership is going more and more to be 
boundary-less, and yet governance is increasingly about boundaries. So, how do you 
manage both of them? (CEO) 
1.2. Monitoring: Watchdog 
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A very large proportion of our metaphorical material on control referred to monitoring 
which is the second stage of the control function: 
If you wanted one word, it’s monitoring. (Chair) 
However, it’s largely a monitoring role. (Chair) 
And that’s why a board [should] probe down into management… its interest will ensure 
that management knows that there are others who are watching what’s happening. 
(Chair) 
It’s also monitoring the health of the organization. (CEO) 
Governance tends to have more of a type of watchdog element. (CEO) 
And to use the collective skills of the governance team… to poke into the corners. 
(CEO) 
We note the possible negative connotations of “probing down” and “poking into the 
corners” that suggest going beyond a straight monitoring role, indicating something more 
active and interventionist. 
1.3. Comparison: Auditor 
It is in the third stage of the control function that metrics become necessary: 
And then having measuring and monitor[ing] type [controls] that enable you to have 
compliance with those Board principles of how business is going to operate. (CEO) 
I think it is about principles, but it’s about having sufficient measurability of those 
things so that they can be audited. (CEO) 
It is in this process too that the control function of directors appears to become most 
concrete and vivid: 
The governance guy…. is the guy who’s clipping the tickets for the audience to come in 
and watch the orchestra. He’s accounting for x number of people. He’s got 3000 tickets 
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in his hand and it equates to what we’ve booked – perfect. That to me is governance. 
(CEO) 
To me governance – and this is my personal view – leadership is king; governance is 
the safety net to make sure that you are ticking the boxes and things are done in a way 
which is appropriate. (CEO) 
And it’s almost like boards have been consumed or taken over by that so your audit and 
risk committee stuff, you know, it’s all clipboards and testing and it’s almost like the 
board and the chief executive on different teams. (CEO) 
We note the almost clerical emphasis in “clipping the tickets”, “ticking the boxes”, 
“clipboards and testing”, and in the last quote the emphasis on this being the likely point at 
which excessive control by the Board may ruffle the feathers of management. 
Our data suggest that the monitoring/auditing functions are perhaps the most common 
metaphor associated with governance.  An auditor is defined by Bazerman, Morgan and 
Loewenstein (1997) as one who examines accounts or records to check their accuracy, and 
adjusts, independently verifies and certifies accounts.  The notion of impartial close scrutiny 
of financial records to verify and confirm the veracity of their reporting statements is also a 
fundamental aspect of corporate governance and accountability for the organisation’s use of 
assets and its performance.  This view echoes the OECD’s Principle VI.D.7 (2008: 25) which 
states that corporate governance is “Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and 
financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational 
control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.” 
With regard to the fiduciary responsibility of the board, the OECD (2008: 151) 
observed that “In some countries, the board is legally required to act in the interest of the 
company, taking into account the interests of shareholders, employees, and the public good.”  
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This formulation departs from a thoroughgoing agency theory perspective in that it highlights 
the board’s responsibility to employees and society as well as to the owners.  It is notable that 
there is no mention of this wider responsibility in the discourses of our participants. 
Financial reporting and the audit function were originally developed as methods of 
ensuring effective stewardship, through which the board is held accountable to shareholders.  
The audit committee, a concept and mechanism widely adopted in governance codes globally, 
has a key role in ensuring the high standards of financial reporting that are essential for the 
confidence of financial markets.  An audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of 
directors (normally consisting predominantly of non-executive directors) that assumes 
responsibility for representing boards of directors on oversight matters related to financial 
reporting, auditing and overall corporate governance (Public Oversight Board, 1993; 
Treadway Commission 1987; Wolnizer 1995; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001).  Functions of an 
audit committee include overseeing how the business is controlled, reported on and 
conducted; reviewing the annual financial statements; and acting as a liaison between the 
auditor and the board of directors (Spira, 2002).  Regulatory bodies and boards themselves 
respond to issues of accountability by forming and strengthening audit committees as well as 
increasing the numbers of non-executive directors, with a focus on achieving improvements 
in the quality of financial reporting (Spira, 2002). 
Audit committee roles specified in corporate governance codes include oversight of 
external and internal audit, involvement in external auditor selection or dismissal, overall 
scope of the audit, results of the audit, internal financial controls, oversight of risk/internal 
control reporting by the board, oversight of financial reporting quality, review of the annual 
financial statements and financial information for publication (Collier and Zaman, 2005, 
DeZoort, 1997, Spira, 2002). 
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The metaphor: “Big Brother” in the context of a firm or an organisation is typically 
thought of as referring to management oversight, scrutiny, watchdog, monitoring, and 
surveillance (e.g. Dragomir, 2008b; Kuschnik, 2008; Palmer, 2002). In Orwell’s 1948 novel 
1984 “Big Brother” represented a totalitarian regime that kept its citizens under close 
surveillance, with overtones of oppression, tyranny, and control/power of the organisation 
over individuals.  Here, we use the epithet “Big Brother” to represent cases in which the 
normal audit function of boards has been perceived by board members themselves to have 
become something less benign, more bureaucratic and more intrusive than is intended and 
deemed functional for the organisation.  This explains the emotional tinge to the quotes 
above, and their use of extreme descriptors such as “every”, “excessive”, “lots” and 
“rampant”.  The Big Brother metaphor appears to convey auditing beyond the point that is 
rational. 
The surveillance function of governance was highlighted by McMahon (1995) in 
relation to corporate accountability and the management of the information environment.  He 
stated, correctly as it turned out, that the 1990s and beyond would demonstrate increasing 
instances of corporate pathologies similar to those of the previous decade.  McMahon applied 
the metaphor of “Big Brother” in relation to accountability and record keeping, noting that the 
deliberate falsification of records reduces or even eliminates the capacity to render activities 
accountable.  He added that poor record keeping through incompetence, lack of resources, or 
lack of organisational commitment (e.g. “staying off the record”, “not putting it in writing”) 
had the same result (1995: 674).  McMahon further noted that measures for accountability are 
bounded by the constraints of the real world, and the dilemma for an open society and liberal 
democracy is that of bringing suspected corporate wrongdoers to account without creating a 
Big Brother state and thereby not only intruding on, and annoying participants (such as those 
in our study quoted above), but also damaging the delicate fabric of society.  Continuing 
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public distrust of directors leads, inevitably, to calls for Even Bigger Brothers to keep an eye 
on Big Brother (Coffee, 2006), i.e. “watchdog” agencies charged with wider business 
regulatory powers, which are relatively new inventions within the framework of a 
Westminster-style democracy. 
1.4. Remedial Action: Police 
Oddly, we found little material in our data set to indicate that directors thought much 
about the fourth ‘action’ phase of control. 
It’s like you’re an umpire, a referee, where’s your yellow card? (Chair) 
Governance always seems to mean policeman to me. You have to comply with the law, 
or comply with company policy. (CEO) 
In these two metaphors, which appeared to be more “disciplinarian” in character, there 
seemed to be greater concern with the notion of compliance than with correction, the “yellow 
card” being the only sanction mentioned. 
 
2. Governance as Strategic and Organizational Control 
Parallel with “management control” images in our data, was a second set of metaphors 
which was also a discourse about control – not over management, but of the organization’s 
strategy processes.  Again the classic steps in the control process could be observed, but 
control appeared to be conceptualized in a much wider, more generous and more qualitative 
frame.  Here participants talked about various roles they felt they had in the wider conduct of 
the organisation’s business: 
2.1 Strategist 
Is the Board concerned with strategy-making as the first stage in a broader process?  A 
few participants seemed to think so: 
It’s more distant horizons in thinking about where that’s going. (Chair) 
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Over governance, they’d sit back and say, well, where will the organization be in 10, or 
15, or 20 years down the track. (Chair) 
But such references tended to be overlaid with what we term the strategy paradox, 
where participants’ concern for strategic input is challenged, compromised and even 
overwhelmed by the unavoidable minutiae of control: 
Some of the boards, which I’m on, spend more time on some of those governance issues 
than they do thinking about the strategic direction. And what I’m saying [is], well, why 
are we here? Are we here to just sort of tick the boxes that management are doing this, 
this, and this? (CEO) 
I find myself sometimes being mired in the detail so much that you cannot see the big 
picture. (CEO) 
So we tend to try to stay at a high level and sort of in a governance mode. But somebody 
in the meeting can very quickly drag it down into minutiae where we actually start 
debating detail and management issues that we shouldn’t be involved in. (CEO) 
2.2. Debating Forum 
In this discourse participants saw the point of governance as very much being the 
creation of a forum for possibly competing ideas, in which openness and diversity might be 
welcomed and unusual ideas aired: 
I think governance is also part of an ongoing conversation where there’s an opportunity 
to talk openly and frankly. And disagree, or move from a model where I wanted 
everyone to agree, to one which is not random but allows a whole lot of disparate views 
to be distilled. (Chair) 
I sort of like the idea of discomfort because, you know, discomfort with people of good 




Allowing everything to run and come into fruition. Creating an environment where the 
oddball idea doesn’t get stamped out before it’s given life. It’s a level playing field for 
everything. (Chair) 
On a board you want diversity of opinion and thinking… and that left field and crazy 
ideas are respected and promoted. (Chair) 
Within the board meeting we are encouraged to have and do have absolute vigorous 
debate. (CEO) 
I actually celebrate differences, I actually want people to say something different so I 
can get a debate going. And encourage everybody to participate in that, and debate the 
issue so that we feel that when we’ve got to a decision point, that we’ve got good 
understanding. (CEO) 
So there’s a sense of having four eyes looking at it, rather than two eyes the same. Also, 
they both respect that the other is wired differently and sees different things, and that’s 
okay. (Chair) 
The essential feature of a debating forum is the communication and challenging of ideas 
in group discussion.  In literature on boardroom practice, the enabling of constructive debate 
is widely regarded as a key characteristic of an effective board.  For example the Californian 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) believes that shareowners should have an 
effective mechanism through which periodically to promote substantive dialogue, encourage 
independent thinking by the board, and stimulate healthy debate around current operations, 
potential risks and proposed developments.  The chair has the crucial function of setting the 
right agenda, providing information, opening board discussions and cultivating openness so as 




With reference to corporate governance best practice, Daily and Dalton (2005) argued 
that despite decades of research, dialogue and debate regarding board effectiveness, and the 
ever-increasing requirements placed on firms, there is little evidence that board effectiveness 
has improved over time.  They argued that one of the central requirements for effectiveness is 
constructive debate, both among directors themselves and between the board and 
management.  Emphasising the importance of board process as ultimately the key to board 
effectiveness, Daily and Dalton (2005) highlighted various factors – such as preoccupation 
with the status quo, “going with the flow” and “groupthink” – that can stifle debate and lead 
to dysfunctional unanimity in board decisions. 
In examining the tendency of boards towards groupthink, Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003) stated that board members should provide critical judgment on managerial 
performance and raise penetrating questions.  They highlighted the paradox whereby directors 
need to systematically monitor and critique the efforts of executives, yet, in the interests of 
avoiding tensions, such critical assessment can decline, leading gradually to corporate 
myopia.  Thus, tight allegiances and CEO duality can inhibit critical feedback on CEO 
performance while, conversely, constructive conflict can stimulate critical feedback and 
counter groupthink. 
Commentators cited in the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, 30-4) 
advocated open discussion whereby “the board can... debate strategic scenarios amongst 
themselves and with management, and select a strategy” and “thoroughly test management on 
its assumptions and the details of the strategy by asking many questions” (Hooper, OECD 
2008: 31); “ask questions and seek second and third opinions where required before making a 
decision” (Chuvastr, OECD 2004: 24-2).  Independent directors, especially, should “add 
value based on their outside experience and ability to raise difficult questions” (Cha, OECD, 
2004: 70-12).  The OECD’s principles also promote the idea of bringing diverse, fresh and 
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new perspectives to the board table: “Independent directors in particular can provide a 
perspective to the discussion based on their experience, technical expertise and wisdom that 
make a great contribution in the area of strategy” (Hooper, OECD 2004: 31); and 
“independent directors can benefit a company through different perspectives and questioning, 
and improved board capabilities” (Anonymous, OECD 2004: 71). 
In contrast with the preoccupation with board composition, board independence and 
board legislative requirements, these strictures – and the debating forum in general – draw 
attention to the neglected area of board processes: not what the board has to do, but how it 
should do it.  Forbes and Milliken (1999: 492, 494) and others suggest that board 
effectiveness depends heavily on socio-psychological processes, especially those pertaining to 
group participation and interaction, the exchange of information and critical discussion.  They 
argue that cognitive conflict, which among board members leverages differences of 
perspective, involves the use of critical and investigative interaction processes that can 
enhance the board’s performance of its control role. 
2.3. Challenger 
Associated with the notion of debate, participants’ conceptualisations of their treatment 
of wider organisational issues involved, substantially, the imagery of challenging.  Board 
members’ role in any debate, it seemed, was not to take part in the creation of strategy, but to 
assist in its approval, refinement or rejection by raising issues that might lead to its 
elimination and force management to answer awkward questions: 
So good governance and good Boards are people that [are]… able to sit back and 
challenge: “Have you thought about this?” “Have you thought about that?” (Chair) 
It’s querying and questioning the direction of the business. (Chair) 
Yeah and making sure that I’m thinking about these issues. And challenge us, making 
sure we’re innovative, that we’re thinking of those issues. (CEO) 
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Making sure management are thinking about sensitivities, the risks about the strategic 
plan. And sort of so it’s not just rubber stamping (but)… using their collective skills to 
question in a productive way on sort of challenging it. (CEO) 
And the board [members] are inputting to those processes their experience, what 
they’ve seen work or not work, whatever it is, their interrogation of concepts. I think 
boards should be engaged in real questioning and real debate with the executive team. 
(CEO) 
You don’t want people who just agree with you. You actually want people that challenge 
things… If you don’t have people who challenge things and everybody’s a yes person 
then it’s just bloody hopeless… So at a board level you want to have a board that’s 
made up of talented individuals who are prepared to put their hand up. (CEO) 
We note the reference in several of these quotes to board members’ “collective skills”, 
“experience”, and “talented individuals”, with the suggestion that the board may have special 
abilities or insight that management does not, yet this somehow is associated with challenging 
rather than creating. 
2.4. Tester 
A step beyond challenging, and as close as participants came to an action phase in 
relation to wider views of the business, is the notion of testing: 
It’s the leadership’s responsibility to articulate that, and present that to a board or a 
governance group. And to be challenged, unpeeled, tested. (CEO) 
The governance role is a testing, analytical examination of where the organization is 
going, to consider the recommendations of management, and either endorse or modify 
them, and then to provide support. (CEO) 




Governance is really there to first of all make an assessment about the quality of what is 
proposed within an organization: [evaluate] strategy, test the logic, and critique the 
approach proposed to be taken by management. (CEO) 
It should be more about “let’s set the direction of the organization; let’s test the 
parameters of the strategy. (CEO) 
Three participants, however, noted with some irritation the negative effects of a testing 
regime being taken too far: 
The governance responsibility is to have a wider view – an overview to test, but not to 
destruct. One of the things that has irritated me immensely in the past… is the director 
who feel that their role in life is to grill to death the chief executive and his managers on 
the basis that it is the director’s responsibility to test, audit and destruction-test the 
proposal. (Chair) 
Quite often you find some directors who feel it’s their god-given role in life to actually 
stress-test everything. They turn management into crash-test dummies. (Chair) 
They’re not just there to rubber stamp things. … But at the end of that process you have 
a leadership team who are actively disengaged because they feel as though they’ve been 
bloody hung out to dry. (CEO) 
2.5 Nay-Sayer 
Notwithstanding the apparent welcoming of disparate views and the debate and 
challenge that this paradigm of governance entailed, we were struck by the fact that again it 
appeared not to involve much in the way of initiative but rather, preoccupation, in the end, 
with narrowing-down and nay-saying.  This was confirmed by a few participants, particularly 




Our governance structure and the association that we have around it at the moment 
would be stifling the crap out of innovation. However, I’m sure it’s not intended that 
way.  (CEO) 
But it seems to me that boards have been overtaken by the same sorts of things I was 
talking about that paralysed our leadership – which is all those management over-
focused, details compliance type management issues. (CEO) 
I think they are disaster avoiders, right? (CEO) 
So, when I first see governance I sort of think of the necessary processes we drive the 
business with – the reviews, the greens, reds and ambers, which by the way, I don’t 
think there should ever be an amber. That’s just telling you that it’s not a red yet. I think 
we should ban ambers everywhere. (CEO) 
It’s probably like a comfort blanket really. They’re there to provide comfort and 
assurance to partners that management has everything under control. … They’re not 
there to lead the organisation or anything of that nature. (CEO) 
 
3. Governance as Power Distribution 
 The most recurrent phrase used by directors in their discourse was that of “checks and 
balances”, which is typically associated with the prevention of abuse of power, normally in 
political systems (e.g. Grant and Keohane, 2005; Persson and Roland, 1997) and can be 
defined as “a system that allows each branch of a government to amend or veto acts of 
another branch so as to prevent any one branch from exerting too much power” (Merriam-
Webster.com).  In the context of corporate governance Cadbury (2002) referred to the need 
for appropriate checks and balances in the governance structure, particularly at board level, 
not only as controls to prevent the abuse of power, but also in relation to building board 
effectiveness.  Thus, for example: 
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It’s a check and balance. (Chair) 
When I think of governance, I think of the necessary checks and balances and reviews 
and stuff that goes on in the business to make sure it’s achieving what it needs to 
achieve. (CEO) 
I actually somewhat believe the view that okay that’s alright if you’re saying their role 
is to be a check and balance and the likes. (Chair) 
This is a deep belief. It’s all about checks and balances in power. Every leader should 
have checks and balances in power. (Chair) 
It’s the whole willingness to accept checks and balances on power. (Chair) 
It’s appropriate that there are checks and balances on what I can or cannot do. That is 
okay and it’s legitimate in a modern democratic society. (Chair) 
Certainly in our organisation, we would look at governance as providing a check and 
balance on leadership. (CEO) 
We note the association with the concept of power versus autonomy, and the notion of 
limitation in power implied by these quotes.  We note also that the phrase “checks and 
balances” was used predominantly by board Chairs rather than CEOs.  On initial reflection 
this emphasis implies support for agency theory, but only one director made this explicit: 
I do see that constant expression that governance is the notion of the moderation of the 
unbridled drive of the management team. (Chair) 
Moreover, only one director thought through the checks and balances to consider the 
consequences: 
It’s about checks and balances on power. So I always use the analogy of Julius Caesar. 
He thought he was and should become a god. His fellow senators thought otherwise. In 




4. Governance as Wise Mentorship 
In line with resource dependency theory, various participants used the terms “mentor” 
and “guide” to express their view of the governance function: 
To be there as a mentor. (Chair) 
It’s more the mentoring type aspects of leadership. (Chair) 
So, if I look at the concept of governance, it’s a question of providing guidance, 
mentoring – not one-on-one but corporate mentoring to the whole organisation. (Chair) 
So to me, and we’ll provide you the guidance and the advice for you to collectively 
achieve. (CEO) 
It’s about guiding the business. (CEO) 
I think they [directors] should be inspiring guiders. (CEO) 
[…] that is to monitor and provide guidance, to be a sounding board. (CEO) 
Others placed emphasis – also implied in quotes cited above in relation to control 
processes – on the special resources, particularly experience and wisdom – that board 
members bring to the organisation. 
The task of those people… is to provide wisdom, moderation, studied consideration and 
an assessment not only of the company’s past and the environment in which it operates, 
but it’s present. (Chair) 
The biggest value that governance processes can add is wisdom and experience to 
support the leadership team. And so I mean when I’m looking for people in the 
governance context I’m really keen to find people with that sort of wisdom, experience 
and judgment to provide that support. (CEO)  
Making sure that the right issues and decisions come to the level where the right heads 
and minds can actually observe and look at it and be aware of it. (Chair) 
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However, there was no reference that we could see in any of this material, to social 
capital (as suggested in the resource-based view of the board’s service role) and its being 
brought to bear in the governance process. 
These conceptualisations encompass the qualities of wisdom, vision, and guidance: 
qualities highlighted by Cadbury (2002: 1) who noted that the word “governance” dates back 
to Chaucer and carried, at that time, the connotation of being “wise and responsible”.  
Similarly, Yocam and Choi (2008: 3) stated that a key element of effective governance was 
sharing collective wisdom between directors and managers to improve managerial judgment. 
But Branson (2003, 995-996), referring to the collapse of Enron in 2001 which ended what he 
termed the “Good Governance Era”, noted the recent decline of the wise counsellor role.  
Corporations instead, he reasoned, came to regard legal services – rather than wisdom – as 
key to protection and success, and as commodities to be purchased from multiple law firms, 
partly in order to avoid any single outside lawyer having an overview of the corporation’s 
business dealings.  According to Branson, corporate actions would thus stem not from a single 
wise view but from a series of disparate deals, with external rather than internal agents.  Such 
a scenario would undoubtedly weaken the “wisdom” aspects of governance.  While wisdom, 
prudence, and guidance were valued by participants, notably absent from the discourses in our 
data was explicit mention of ethical standards and direct reference to moral judgment – 




Key questions arising from board members’ discourses concern whether or not 
governance contributes value.  Might governance actually hinder enterprise and value 
creation?  What do directors’ mind-sets reveal about the practice of governance?  Our analysis 
has shown that compliance aspects and the board’s monitoring and control role appear to 
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dominate board members’ mind-sets.  With regard to the purpose of governance, the control 
role is a key governance mechanism, as stated by the OECD (2004, VI: 24): “…the board 
should fulfil certain key functions, including monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.”  
However, these key board functions also include “Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, 
major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance 
objectives” which indicates a strategic leadership role for boards. 
From the literature it is clear that boards have a responsibility to ensure both 
organisational conformance and performance, in carrying out their fiduciary duty.  Yet, as in 
our data, the literature reveals a similar emphasis on compliance and pre-occupation with 
control.  Short, et al (1999) discussed the development of the corporate governance debate in 
the UK since the formation of the Cadbury Committee in 1991, noting a shift in emphasis 
towards enterprise over this time.  They cited the Hampel Report (1998) which argued that 
while accountability by public companies was essential, the emphasis on this requirement had 
obscured business prosperity, which it regarded as the most important aspect of corporate 
performance.  The report stated that it wished to see the balance between business prosperity 
and accountability corrected, arguing that optimal corporate governance may be achieved 
through a system of structures and processes in which accountability and enterprise aspects 
reinforce each other.  There is little evidence from our data that such a shift in emphasis has 
found its way into practice in the boardroom. 
 Garratt (2007) noted that “governance” can be traced back to the ancient Greek 
kubernetes, meaning “the steersman”, that is, the person who gives direction to a ship or 
organisation. As he observed, this meaning flows through Latin and French language 
development and appears in Middle English in the Canterbury Tales, but then virtually 
disappears.  This evolution away from the original meaning, according to Garratt, corresponds 
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with the creation of a corporate mind-set and culture fuelled by the growing notion that 
“governance equals compliance”.  Like Healy (2003), Garratt warns that “Such a compliance-
based system tends to drive out ethical enterprise” (p.11).  Board members in our sample 
confirm this risk. 
Empirical studies of the board’s role have typically attempted to associate boards with 
corporate financial performance – among which no consistent relationship has been found 
(e.g. Daily et al., 2003).  Literature referring to boards’ leadership role in driving strategy and 
corporate performance is scant, although Zahra and Pearce (1989) provided a seminal work in 
their integrative paper outlining perspectives on the role of boards.  In their paper they 
highlighted the narrow definition of company performance in the board literature and 
controversy over the board’s strategic role.  In setting an agenda for corporate governance 
research, Zahra and Pearce (1989: 333) concluded that “Directors cannot only protect the 
interests of shareholders through effective controls of managerial actions, but also have the 
potential to render valuable services to the firm in the shaping of its strategic posture”.  Our 
data hint that board members want to contribute more effectively to the strategic process but 
faced with creative challenges, default instead to conformance.  This represents a major 
unresolved paradox, apparently rendering some directors apparently unable to act — paralysis 
through paradox. 
Garratt (2007: 11) also argued that “…the role of the board of directors is to balance 
and rebalance continuously their irresolvable dilemma”, but asked “how do we drive our 
enterprise forward while keeping it under prudent control?”  In highlighting the paradox 
inherent in this requirement he urged boards to develop stronger ways of leading their 
organisation.  To achieve this, he advocated that boards “develop new ways of learning — 
especially of thinking strategically and becoming more sensitised to the dynamics of their 
33 
 
changing external environments” which “will take them well beyond the comforts of their 
specialist managerial disciplines and into the true world of directing”. 
Short, et al (1999) called for research which seeks board members’ views on how they 
explicitly weigh the implications of the need to meet accountability requirements with the 
impact on enterprise and vice versa.  Our study responds to their call, but also highlights the 
need for further studies that aim to better understand how board members might address this 
challenge. 
In a comparative review of theories of corporate governance and economic performance 
O’Sullivan (2000) highlighted the need to bring the analysis of innovative enterprise into the 
corporate governance debates, and called for a research agenda that seeks to understand the 
relationship between corporate performance and innovation.  She noted that research on the 
process of innovation and corporate governance has been limited because the leading theories 
of corporate governance do not systematically incorporate an analysis of the economics of 
innovation.  According to O’Sullivan, given the centrality of the process of innovation to the 
performance of dynamic economies, the types of corporate governance that will promote 
economic performance can only be determined within a conceptual framework that 
incorporates an analysis of the economics of innovation.  We concur, but suggest that on the 
basis of our data, the impact of board members’ mind-sets regarding the role of governance in 
innovation will also need to be taken into account in developing such a framework. 
We believe that analysis of metaphors-in-use within this field could contribute new 
thinking toward unlocking creative solutions to recurrent problems within modern governance 
architectures, systems and practice, for which the usual recourse is ever tighter regulation in 
the face of increasing corporate and operational complexity and systemic risk, as 
demonstrated by the 2008 global financial crisis and its economic aftermath.  But as our data 
suggest, such recourse may have unintended consequences and does not help to better balance 
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accountability with enterprise.  Moreover, extensive debate in the corporate governance 
literature over the conceptual adequacy of the dominant frameworks – most notably agency 
theory, which underpins corporate governance laws and best practice guidelines – suggests 
that frame-breaking and new theory building could lead to more explanatory governance 
models.  For this purpose uncovering, through analysis, tacit and pervasive mental models 
expressed through the language of metaphor could be a useful starting point. 
 
References 
Alvesson, M., 1994, “Talking in organizations: managing identity and impressions in an 
advertising agency”.  Organization Studies 15: 535-563.  
 
Alvesson, M. and Karreman, D., 2011, “Decolonising discourse: critical reflections on 
organizational discourse analysis”.  Human Relations, 64: 1121-1146. 
 
Alvesson, M, and Karreman, D., 2000, “Varieties of discourse: On the study of 
organizations through discourse analysis”.  Human Relations 53: 1125–1149. 
 
Alvesson, M., and Skoldberg, K., 2009, Reflexive methodology: New vistas for qualitative 
research.  2nd edition.  London: SAGE. 
 
Amernic, J., Craig, R. and Tourish, D., 2007, “The transformational leader as pedagogue, 
physician, architect, commander, and saint: five root metaphors in Jack Welch’s letter to 
stockholders of General Electric”.  Human Relations, 60: 1839-1872. 
 
Baer, M., 2008, “Corporate policing and corporate governance: what can we learn from 
Hewlett-Packard’s pretexting scandal?”  77 U. Cin. L. Rev. Manuscript at 55–57, on file with 
the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133117  
 
Bazerman, M.H., Morgan, K.P., and Loewenstein, G., 1997, “The impossibility of auditor 
independence”.  Sloan Management Review, 38: 89-94. 
 
Beattie, T., 2005, “Sex, death and melodrama”.  The Way, 44: 160-176. 
 
Boxenbaum, E., and Rouleau, L., 2011, “New knowledge products as bricolage: Metaphors 
and scripts in organizational theory”. Academy of Management Review, 36: 272–296. 
 
Branson, D., 2003, “Enron – when all systems fail: creative destruction or roadmap to 
corporate governance reform?”  Villanova Law Review, 48: 989-1022. 
 
Brown, R.D., 1994, “Corporate governance: the director as watchdog, juggler or fall guy”.  




Buchanan, D. and Dawson, P., 2007, “Discourse and audience: organizational change as 
multi-story process”.  Journal of Management Studies. 44: 669-686. 
 
Cadbury, A., 2002), Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
CalPERS, 2010, Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance.  California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System, Lincoln Plaza - 400 Q Street - Sacramento, CA 
  
Cazal, D. and Inns, D., 1998. “Metaphor, language and meaning”.  In D. Grant, T. Keenoy 
and C. Oswick (Eds), Discourse and organizations.  London: Sage, pp. 258–278. 
 
Coffee, J. C., Jr., 2006, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Collier, P., and Zaman, M., 2005, “Convergence in European governance codes: the audit 
committee concept”.  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 753-768. 
 
Cornelissen, J., 2006, “Metaphor and the dynamics of knowledge in organizational theory: A 
case study of the organizational identity metaphor”.  Journal of Management Studies, 43: 
683–709. 
 
Cornelissen, J., 2004, “What are we playing at? Theatre, organization, and the use of 
metaphor”.  Organization Studies, 25: 705–726. 
 
Daily, C.M. and Dalton, D.R., 2005, “Corporate governance best practices” the proof is in 
the process”.  Journal of Business Strategy, 27: 5-7. 
 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R. and Canella, A.A. Jr., 2003, “Corporate governance: decades of 
dialogue and data”.  Academy of Management Review, 28: 371-382. 
 
Demb, A., and Neubauer, F.F., 1992, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
DeZoort, F.T., 1997, “An investigation of audit committees’ oversight responsibilities”.  
Abacus: 208-227. 
 
DeZoort, F.T., and Salterio, S.E., 2001, “The effects of corporate governance experience 
and financial-reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee members’ judgments”.  
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20: 31-47. 
 
Dragomir, V., 2008a, “Highlights for a history of corporate governance”. European Journal 
of Management, 8: 32-43. 
 
Dragomir, V., 2008b, “Issues of legitimacy and accountability affecting corporate 
governance codes”.  Available at SSRN 1085393. 
 





El-Sawad, A., 2005, “Becoming a lifer? Unlocking career through metaphor”.  Journal of 
Occupational and OrganizationalPsychology 78: 23–41. 
 
Entman, R., (1993). “Framing: towards clarification of a fractured paradigm”.  Journal of 
Communication, 43: 51–58. 
 
Eubanks, P., 1999, “Conceptual metaphor as rhetorical response: a reconsideration of 
metaphor”.  Written Communication, 16: 171–199. 
 
Fairhurst, G., 2011, Communicating leadership metaphors. In M. Alvesson and A. Spicer 
(Eds.), Metaphors We Lead By: Understanding Leadership in the Real World.  London: 
Routledge, pp.180-193. 
 
Fairhurst, G. T., 2009, “Considering context in discursive leadership research”. Human 
Relations, 62: 1607-1633. 
 
Fleming, P., 2005, “Metaphors of resistance”. Management Communication Quarterly, 19: 
45–66. 
 
Forbes, D. and Milliken, F.J., 1999, “Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding 
boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups”.  The Academy of Management 
Review, 24: 489-505. 
 
Ford, J., 2006, “Discourses of Leadership: Gender, Identity and Contradiction in a UK Public 
Sector Organization”.  Leadership 2: 77–99. 
 
Fort, T.L. and Noone, J.J., 1999, “Banded contracts: mediating institutions, and corporate 
governance: a naturalist analysis of contractual theories of the firm”.  Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 62: Challenges to Corporate Governance: 163-213. 
 
Gabrielsson, J. and Huse, M., 2004, “Context, behaviour, and evolution: challenges in 
research on boards and governance”.  International Studies of Management and Organization, 
34: 11-36. 
 
Galbraith, J.K., 1967, The New Industrial State.  New American Library.  
 
Gardiner, J.J., 2006, “Transactional, transformational and transcendent leadership: 
metaphors mapping the evolution of the theory and practice of governance”.  Leadership 
Review, 6: 62-76. 
 
Garratt, B., 2007, “Dilemmas, uncertainty, risks and board performance”.  BT Technology 
Journal, 25: 11-18. 
 
Gillette, A.B., Noe, T.H., and Rebello, M.J., 2003, “Corporate board composition, protocols 
and voting behaviour: experimental evidence”.  The Journal of Finance, 58: 1997-2031. 
 
Ghoshal, S., 2005, “Bad management theories are destroying good management practices”. 




Gowler, D., and Legge, K., 1989), “Rhetoric in bureaucratic careers: Managing the meaning 
of managerial success”.  In M. B. Arthur, D. T. Hall, and B. S. Lawrence (eds.), Handbook of 
career theory.  Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 437-453. 
 
Grant, D., Hardy, C., Oswick, C. and Putnam, L., 2004, The SAGE handbook of 
organizational discourse.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Grant D, Iedema R and Oswick C., 2010, “Discourse and critical management studies”. In: 
M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman and H. Willmott (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Critical 
Management Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 213−231. 
 
Grant, D., Iedema, R., and Oswick, C., 2009, “Discourse and critical management”.  In M. 
Alvesson, T. Bridgman and H. Willmott, (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Critical 
Management Studies.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch 10. 
 
Grant, D., Keenoy, T., and Oswick, C., (eds.),1998, Discourse and Organization. London: 
Sage. 
 
Grant, R.W., and Keohane, R.O., 2005, “Accountability and abuses of power in world 
politics”.  American Political Science Review, 99: 29-43.  
 
Green, R.M., 1993, “Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate 
Governance”. 50 Washington & Lee Law Review, 1409: 1416-1422. 
 
Greenwood, D.J.H., 2004, “Enronitis: why good corporations go bad”. Columbia Business 
Law Review: 773-848. 
 
Harré, R., 1984, The Philosophies of Science.  2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heracleous, L., and Jacobs, C. D., 2008, “Understanding organizations through embodied 
metaphors”. Organization Studies, 29: 45–78. 
 
Healy, J., 2003, Corporate Governance & Wealth Creation in New Zealand.  Palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press. 
 
Hendry, K., and Kiel, G. 2004, “The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency 
and organizational control perspectives”.  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12: 500-520. 
 
Henry, D., 2004, “Will directors morph into corporate constables?”  BusinessWeek, 
6/14/2004, 3887, 38. 
 
Herman, E.S., 1981, Corporate Control, Corporate Power.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hussain, Z., and Cornelius, N., 2006, Change in Metaphorical Position of Organisational 
Stakeholders.  University of Bradford, School of Management. 
 
Iedema, R., 2007, “On the multi-modality, materiality and contingency of organization 
discourse”.  Organization Studies, 28: 931-946. 
38 
 
Inkson, K., 2006, Understanding Careers: The Metaphors of Working Lives.  Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
 
Jäger, S., 2001, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a 
critical discourse and dispositive analysis”.  In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.), Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis.  London: SAGE, pp.32-62. 
 
Johnson, E. I., 2005, “The role model of the board: a preliminary study of the roles of 
Icelandic boards”.  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 710-717. 
 
Keenoy, T., 1990, “HRM: a aase of the wolf in sheep’s clothing?”  Personnel Review, 19: 3-
9. 
 
Kerklaan, L., 2011, “Visualization: the bridge between commitment and control”. Measuring 
Business Excellence, 15: 92-99. 
 
Kirkpatrick, G., 2009, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 
financial market trends.  Paris: OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance. 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 
 
Kosnik, R.D., 1987, “Greenmail: a study of board performance in corporate governance”.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 163-185. 
 
Kuhn, T. 2006, “A ‘demented work ethic’and a ‘lifestyle firm’: Discourse, identity, and 
workplace time commitments”.  Organization Studies, 27: 1339-1358. 
 
Kuschnik, B., 2008, “The Sarbanes Oxley Act: “Big Brother is Watching You” or adequate 
measure of corporate governance regulation?”  Rutgers Business Law Journal, 5: 65-95. 
 
Lakoff, G., 2004, Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate.  
Chelsea Green. 
 
Lakoff, G and Johnson, M. 1980, Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Leitch, S., and Palmer, I., 2010, “Analysing texts in context: Current practices and new 
protocols for Critical Discourse Analysis in organization studies”.  Journal of Management 
Studies, 6: 1194–1212. 
 
McMahon, L., 1995, “Corporate accountability in Australia: managing the information 
environment for corporate accountability”.  Journal of Business Ethics, 14: 673-681. 
 
Mace, M.L., 1971, Directors: Myth and Reality.  Boston: Harvard University Press. 
 
Miles, M. B., and Huberman, A. M., 1984, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook of New 
Methods.  2nd Edition, London: Sage Publications. 
 
Morgan, G. 1996, “Is there anything more to be said about metaphor?”  In D. Grant and C. 




Morgan, G., 1986, Images of Organization.  London: SAGE. 
 
Morgan, G., 1983, “More on metaphor: Why we cannot control tropes in administrative 
science”. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 601-607. 
 
Morgan, G. 1980, “Paradigms, metaphors, and puzzle solving in organization theory”. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 605-622. 
 
Norburn, D., 1985, “European boardrooms and the American Law Institute proposals”.  
Working Paper 85.20, Cranfield School of Management, UK. Available at 
https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/.../S%20%26%20E%2085-20.PDF  
 
OECD, 2004, Using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: A Boardroom 
Perspective.  Paris.  Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/60/40823806.pdf  
 
Oberlechner, T., and Mayer-Schoenberger, V., 2002, “Through their own words: Towards 
a new understanding of leadership through metaphors”. John F. Kennedy School of 
Government (Harvard University) Faculty Research Working Papers Series. 
 
O'Sullivan, M., 2000, “The innovative enterprise and corporate governance”.  Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 24: 393-416. 
 
Oswick, C., and Grant, D., (eds.) 1996a, Organizational Development: Metaphorical 
Explorations.  London: Pitman. 
 
Oswick, C., and Grant, D., 1996b, “The organization of metaphors and the metaphors of 
organization: Where are we and where do we go from here?”  In D. Grant and C. Oswick 
(eds.) Metaphor and Organizations.  London: SAGE, pp.213-326. 
 
Oswick, C., and Montgomery, J., 1999, “Images of an organisation: the use of metaphor in a 
multinational company”. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 12: 501-523. 
 
Oswick, C., Putnam, L., and Keenoy, T., 2004, “Tropes, discourse and organizing”. In D. 
Grant, C. Hardy, C. Oswick and L. Putnam (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organizational 
Discourse.  London: SAGE, pp.105-128. 
 
Palmer, G., 2002, “Big Brother: an experiment in governance”. Television & New Media, 3: 
295-310. 
 
Persson, T., and Roland. G., 1997, “Separation of powers and political accountability”.  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1163-1202. 
 
Public Oversight Board (POB) of the SEC Practice Section 1993, Special Report: Issues 
Confronting the Accounting Profession. Stamford, CT: Public Oversight Board. 
 
Putnam, L, and Fairhurst, G., 2001, “Discourse analysis in organizations”. In F. Jablin and 





Pye, A., 2002, “Corporate Boards, Investors and Their Relationships: accounts of 
accountability and corporate governing in action”. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 9: 186-195. 
 
Short, H., Keasey, K., Wright, M., and Hull, A., (1999). “Corporate governance: From 
accountability to enterprise”. Accounting and Business Research, 29(4), 337-352. 
 
Spira, L.F., 2002, The Audit Committee: Performing Corporate Governance.  Norwell, MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Stokes, K., 1998, “Rethinking organization”.  International University of Japan, Graduate 
School of International Relations, DAC 6160.  Retrieved 20/04/10 from 
http://www.iuj.ac.jp/gsir/iris/syllabus/syllabus.cfm?Category=DAC&Num=6160 
 
Sundaramurthy, C. and Lewis, M., 2003, “Control and collaboration: paradoxes of 
governance”.  The Academy of Management Review, 28: 397- 415. 
 
Tietze, S., Cohen, L. and Musson, G., 2003, Understanding Organization Through 
Language.  London: Sage. 
 
Tourish, D. and Hargie, O., 2012, “Metaphors of failure and the failures of metaphor: a 
critical study of root metaphors used by bankers in explaining the banking crisis”.  
Organization Studies, 33: 1045-1069. 
 
Treadway Commission, 1987, National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
Tsoukas, H., 1991, “The missing link: a transformational view of metaphors in organizational 
science”.  Academy of Management Review, 16: 566–585. 
 
Turnage, A., 2010, Identification and Disidentification in Organizational Discourse: A 
Metaphor Analysis of E-mail Communication at Enron. PhD Thesis, North Carolina State 
University. 
 
Vance, S.C., 1983, Boards of Directors: Structure and Performance.  OR: University of 
Oregon Press. 
 
Watson, T., 1994, In Search of Management.  London: Routledge. 
 
Weedon, C., 1987, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Wolfson, N., 1984, The Modern Corporation: Free Market Versus Regulation.  NY: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Wolnizer, P. W., 1995, “Are audit committees red herrings?”  Abacus, 31: 45–66. 
 
Xu, Q., 1999, “TQM as an arbitrary sign for play: discourse and transformation”.  




Yocam, E., and Choi, A., 2008, Corporate Governance: A Board Director’s Pocket Guide: 
Leadership, Diligence and Wisdom.  Lincoln, NE: Yocam Publishing. 
 
Zahra, S. A., and Pearce II, J. A., 1989, “Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: A review and integrative model”. Journal of management, 15: 291-334. 
